Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo by Brown, Bartram S.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 1 Symposium: Final Status for Kosovo: 
Untying the Gordian Knot 
Article 11 
December 2004 
Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo 
Bartram S. Brown 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo , 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 235 
(2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol80/iss1/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
HUMAN RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE FINAL STATUS OF
KOSOVO
BARTRAM S. BROWN*
IN TRO D U CTIO N ................................................................................................ 236
I. BASIC BACKGROUND ON KOsOvA/KOSOvO ................................................ 238
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION: ISSUES AND
A PPLICA B ILITY ............................................................................................ 240
A. Historical Development of Self-Determination ..................................... 240
1. The Wilsonian National Model of Self-Determination .................... 241
2. The Post-WW II Decolonization Model of
Self-D eterm ination ........................................................................... 244
3. The Post-Cold W ar M odel ............................................................... 247
B. Ambiguities Inherent in the Concept of Self-Determination ................. 248
1. D efining a People ............................................................................. 248
2. Does a "People" Really Have a Right to External
Self-D eterm ination? ........................................... . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. .. . . .. .. 250
C. Possible Forms of Self-Determination for Kosovo ............................... 251
1. Independence and Sovereignty ......................................................... 251
2. Reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia ................................................ 252
3. Intermediate Possibilities, Including Autonomy and the
Statu s Q uo......................................................................................... 252
III. CAN ANYONE SOLVE THE PROBLEM?: PATHS TO THE
REALIZATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR KOSOVO ............................ 254
A. The Possibility of a Negotiated Solution ............................................... 254
B. Does the Security Council Have the Legal Authority to
Award Sovereignty to Kosovo? ............................................................. 256
C. Political Aspect: The Reluctance of UN Members to Impose
External Decisions on Issues of Sovereignty and Territorial
Integ rity ................................................................................................ 2 5 8
1. H istorical Perspectives ...................................................................... 258
2. Politics of the Current Security Council ........................................... 259
3. The Evolving Practice of New State Recognition and Its
Relevance to Kosovo's Final Political Status ................................... 261
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Program in International and Comparative Law, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Visiting Fellow, 2004, Lauterpacht Research
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, U.K.
235
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
IV. A HUMAN RIGHTS BASED PERSPECTIVE ON SELF-
DETERM INATION FOR Kosovo .................................................................. 264
A. Sovereign Rights in Context: The Transformation and
D ism em berm ent of a State .................................................................... 266
B. When Sovereign Rights Must Yield: A Failure of Just and
Effective Guarantees for Minority Rights ............................................. 268
C. Compromise May Be Necessary to Preserve Minority Rights .............. 270
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RELEVANT TO FINAL STATUS
ISSU E S ........................................................................................................ 2 7 1
INTRODUCTION
Kosovar Albanians, as a minority within Serbia, and Kosovo Serbs, as
a minority within Kosovo, have both suffered unacceptable mistreatment in
recent years. This widespread misery has transformed the situation in Kos-
ovo into a matter of international concern1 and Kosovo itself into a theatre
of international involvement. The 1999 NATO bombing mission2 suc-
ceeded in ending the Serbian persecution of Kosovar Albanians. In the
aftermath UNMIK 3, the present United Nations civil administration of
Kosovo was established, and KFOR4, a UN-sponsored international secu-
rity force for Kosovo, precluded the Kosovo Liberation Army from com-
mitting further acts of violence and terrorism against Kosovo Serbs. The
cycle of revenge continues, as the Serbian minority in Kosovo remains the
target of ethnically targeted mob violence. 5
The international community's reliance upon an international admini-
stration and security force was only an interim solution leaving fundamen-
tal issues to be decided later. The tension between Serbs and Albanians in
Kosovo will not be resolved until the future political status of that territory
has been finally determined.
The final political status of Kosovo is ultimately a human rights issue,
and a just and viable solution must balance the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Serbia with the human rights of Kosovar Albanians. At another
1. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
2. See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1683, 1684-93 (2000).
3. UNMIK, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, was established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1244. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 401 Ith mtg. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
4. The Kosovo Force ("KFOR") is a NATO-led international force, authorized by the United
Nations, and responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. See
http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm (Sept. 1,2004).
5. See Nicholas Wood, Kosovo Smolders After Mob Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at
AI0; Nicholas Wood & David Binder, Treasured Churches in a Cycle of Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2004, at B9.
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level, the challenge is how best to achieve self-determination for Kosovar
Albanians while ensuring the rights of other groups and minorities within
Kosovo. This legal and political puzzle exemplifies the clash between the
traditional state-centered rights associated with territorial sovereignty and
more modern notions of universal human rights.
This Article argues that internal forms of self-determination, involv-
ing a degree of self-government and the respect for minority rights, should
be available as a matter of right, but that claims for external forms of self-
determination, such as independence or the transfer of sovereignty to an-
other state, cannot generally be satisfied and can rarely if ever be demanded
as a matter of right. International law neither demands, nor excludes, the
possibility of independence for Kosovo. It does, however, require an out-
come consistent with the fundamental human rights of all concerned as
well as with the maintenance of international peace and security.
Those who assume that an independent and sovereign Kosovo will in-
evitably materialize may well be disappointed. Those who assume that the
territorial integrity of Serbia cannot be altered without its consent run a
similar risk. Both the local need for resolution of the final status issue and
the global cause of international peace and security will best be served if
the broadest possible range of alternative solutions to final status is given
careful consideration. Political negotiations between the interested parties
themselves offer the best opportunity to balance the many legal and politi-
cal factors involved.
6
Failing agreement between the interested parties, the UN may be
forced, however reluctantly, to decide upon a solution to final status. Ulti-
mately, the Security Council has the authority to implement whatever solu-
tion it decides is necessary to maintain international peace and security, as
well as to protect the human rights of all those concerned. 7 If it becomes
necessary for the Security Council to determine the final status of Kosovo,
the demonstrated willingness of Kosovar Albanian political leaders, Ser-
bian leaders, and the leaders of other interested groups to engage in genuine
negotiations on final status issues could be an important factor in the Coun-
cil's ultimate assessment and decision.
After offering a brief background on the situation in Kosovo, this Ar-
ticle will examine the historical development of the idea of self-
determination and consider alternative forms of self-determination and
6. The interested parties include not only Albanians and Serbs, but also a number of other
smaller ethnic groups resident in Kosovo, including the Roma.
7. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42 (authorizing the Security Council to decide upon whatever
measures it determines are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security).
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potential paths to self-determination for Kosovo. This article will then offer
a human rights-based perspective on final status and offer policy sugges-
tions on how best to move toward a positive resolution of the issue.
I. BASIC BACKGROUND ON KosovA/Kosovo 8
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY") was a multi-
ethnic state under its post-World War II Communist leader Marshal Tito.9
Tito successfully used federalism to ensure his control over the country by
balancing the power of different ethnic groups within six republics (Serbia,
Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina) and
two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina), fre-
quently playing the different nationalities against each other. 10 A decade
after Tito died in 1980, the SFRY began to fragment. I I Under the ultrana-
tionalistic leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia, as the largest and most
influential republic within the federal state, sought to dominate the
SFRY. 12 Serbian repression provoked ethnic backlash by members of other
groups, 13 and active hostilities broke out between the Serbian dominated
Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or JNA) and
organized armed resistance in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and, ulti-
mately, in Kosovo. As the JNA sought to keep the country together by
coercion, interethnic violence and repression spread to affect victims of all
nationalities.
14
In 1991, as the fighting continued, four of the constituent republics,
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, declared indc-
8. The Albanian-language name for the territory in question is "Kosova," and Albanian-speaking
residents prefer that name. The English language name "Kosovo" follows the Serbian spelling, and this
standard English spelling is used in this article.
9. Tony Barber, The Bosnia Crisis: Serbs, Croats and Muslims: Who Hates Who and Why,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 9, 1992, at 16.
10. See Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, I.C.T.Y., at para. 65
(May 7, 1997).
11. Id. at para. 70.
12. See Tim Judah, The Serbs: The Sweet and Rotten Smell of History, 126 DAEDALUS 23 (1997).
13. As one article noted:
The scale of the killing in ex-Yugoslavia is disputed. But its savagery is not in doubt. In less
than two years of war, many thousands-some say many tens of thousands-have died. Snip-
ers of all sides pick off civilians, and all have murdered helpless prisoners. The Serbs have
ruthlessly shelled towns, and have at times adopted rape as a method of war. Gunmen have
driven countless people from their villages and seized or burned their homes.
The Road to Ruin, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1993, at 23.
14. Patricia M. Wald, Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 69 SOC. RES. 1119
(2002).
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pendence from the SFRY. 15 All four of these republics requested diplo-
matic recognition as newly independent states from the European Commu-
nity ("EC") and its members. 16 Local authorities in Kosovo, formally
classified as an autonomous province of Serbia and not as a Federal Repub-
lic, attempted to follow suit, but their declaration had little practical effect
as Serbia retained control of Kosovo. 17 The EC, predecessor to today's
European Union ("EU"), agreed on certain "Guidelines on the Recognition
of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union"'18 and established
an Arbitration Commission, known as the "Badinter Commission," 19 to
assist in settling disputes concerning recognition by the EC and its member
states. The Badinter Commission recommended that the EC recognize
some of the former republics but not others. 20 Nonetheless, the EC recog-
nized all four of the republics, effectively confirming their status as inde-
pendent states. 21 The Badinter Commission declared the dissolution of the
SFRY to be complete in an opinion issued on July 4, 1992,22 and never
made any recommendation on the recognition of Kosovo. 23 Widespread
15. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11 & July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494 [hereinafter Arbitration Com-
mission: Opinions]-
16. Id. at 1490 (Introductory Note by Maurizio Ragazzi).
17. PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 198-99 (2002).
18. European Community, Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1486 [hereinafter EC Declaration &
Guidelines].
19- The "Badinter Commission" was chaired by Robert Badinter, President of the Constitutional
Council in France.
20. The Badinter Commission concluded that Macedonia (Opinion No. 6) and Slovenia (Opinion
No. 7) had fully satisfied the conditions for recognition set out in the EC guidelines, that Croatia had
satisfied them with one minor reservation (Opinion No. 5), but that "the will of the peoples of Bosnia-
Hercegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been
fully established." Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1503 (Badinter Opinion No. 4).
21. The EC states followed Germany's early lead and recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January
15, 1992. See Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1992, at A10. The EC recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina on April 7, 1992, but declined to recognize
Macedonia at that time due to the Greek government's objection to the name "Macedonia." See Alan
Riding, Europe Nods to Bosnia, Not Macedonia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at A3. The United States,
although initially reluctant to recognize break-away republics still fighting Serbia to establish their
independence, recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, oii April 7, 1992. See David
Binder, U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1992, at A10.
Recognition of Macedonia was complicated by the Greek government's objection to its use of the name
"Macedonia," said to belong solely to Grecce. William D. Montalbano, Greeks Angered, but They Have
Word for it-FYROM, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A4. Eventually, Europe and the US recognized
Macedonia as "FYROM," the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Id.
22. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1523 (Badinter Opinion No. 8).
23. The Badinter Commission issued opinions on the applications of four former Yugoslav repub-
lics for international recognition, but none on similar requests from Kosovo, which was formally classi-




killings, rape, and ethnic cleansing continued in Croatia and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina until ended by the 1995 Dayton Accords.
24
Years later, in 1999, the cycle of violence in Kosovo reached a horri-
fying crescendo. The Serbians' widespread crimes against humanity and
other shocking violence against Albanian Kosovars led to increasing armed
resistance to Serbian rule. Additionally, groups such as the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army committed acts of violence and terrorism against local Serbs.
25
In the midst of this chaos, NATO launched a massive bombing campaign in
Yugoslavia to compel the Milosevic regime to stop the atrocities in Kos-
ovo. This controversial tactic26 was ultimately successful in forcing the
Yugoslav government to agree to the military occupation of Kosovo by a
multilateral force (KFOR) and to transitional administration of Kosovo by
a United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by a Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The missions of both KFOR
and UNMIK were authorized by a binding resolution of the Security Coun-
cil.27 UNMIK is charged with a number of tasks including "[p]romoting the
establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, ' '28 and "[f]acilitating a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future status."'29 Thus, the issue of Kosovo's final po-
litical status was left open for future negotiation between representatives of
Serbia and of the Kosovar Albanians.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION: ISSUES AND APPLICABILITY
A. Historical Development of Self-Determination
Self-determination is one of the most potent concepts in all of human
rights. Its philosophical basis lies in the notion of popular sovereignty, and
thus, self-determination reflects the same ideals that prompted the Ameri-
24. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 75. These accords, negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, ended the fighting in Bosnia and set out a plan
for reconstruction with the goal of maintaining peace in the region and reestablishing a multiethnic
state. Id
25. See S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 1, at I (condemning "the use of excessive force by Serbian
police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by
the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist
activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training").
26. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1684-86.
27. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3.
28. Id. ll(a).
29. Id. 1 (e).
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can and French Revolutions of the late 1700s.30 Democracy and self-
government are the classic forms of internal self-determination. 3 1 Over a
century after these revolutions, the Bolsheviks, most notably Lenin, popu-
larized the term "self-determination." 32 Subsequently, Woodrow Wilson
gave new life to the concept of self-determination when he publicly en-
dorsed the concept in 1918 as a fundamental principle linked to the equal
rights of all peoples. 33 Although the principle of self-determination has
evolved since then, its significance today is best understood in its historical
context.
1. The Wilsonian National Model of Self-Determination
United States President Woodrow Wilson, in his former role as a pro-
fessor of political science, was a longtime advocate of democracy and in-
ternal self-government. 34 However, Wilson's name is more commonly
associated with support for the external self-determination of peoples. Wil-
son's insistence upon statehood and territorial integrity for Albania,35 de-
spite European proposals to the contrary, exemplifies the "national model"
of self-determination. At a time when European powers were accustomed
to creating and dismembering states as a matter of balancing power poli-
tics, the "national model" of self-determination was a very progressive
notion.
Known for his political idealism, Wilson rejected the idea of balance
of power politics, describing it as "discredited. '36 Although Wilson is re-
membered for championing the cause of Albanian statehood, in practice, he
often endorsed compromise on the nationalist demands of other groups. 37
30. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 11
(1995).
3 1. See generally Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession; Responding to Claimsfor Ethnic Self-
Determination, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 13.
32. Lenin viewed self-determination as "an anti-colonialist postulate," CASSESE, supra note 30, at
33, and in doing so anticipated the post-World War 1I focus on self-determination as decolonization.
See infra notes 47-62 and the accompanying text.
33. Max M. Kampelman, Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An Urgent Need to
Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism, WASH. Q., Summer 1993, at 5.
34. T.A. Parmalee, A Biography of President Woodrow Wilson, at
http:/fball.tcnj.edulpols370/wilson.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
35. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES N INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1979).
36. Wilson stated before the US Congress in 1918 that "peoples and provinces are not to be
bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even
the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power." Woodrow Wilson, President Wil-
son's Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances, Delivered in Joint
Session (Feb. 11, 1918), reprinted in I THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 472, 478
(Albert Shaw ed. 1924) [hereinafter WILSON'S 1918 ADDRESS TO CONGRESS].
37. See Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wil-
sonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,4 (1976).
CHICAGO-KENT LA WRE VIEW
Wilson's national model of self-determination contained the seeds of the
decolonization concept, which would be prevalent after the Second World
War.3
8
Wilson saw self-determination in imperative terms:
Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by
an international conference or an understanding between rivals and an-
tagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be
dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-
determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of
action which, statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.
39
Wilson's model of self-determination was based not only on the idea
of popular sovereignty, but also on an acknowledgement of the equality of
peoples; thus, in the following quotation Wilson attributed the First World
War to a denial of national rights and aspirations:
This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and
of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their
claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political
life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things
impossible for the future .... It has come about in the altered world in
which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect
the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materi-
als and fair and equal conditions of trade.
40
In Wilson's view, self-determination was both an imperative principle
and a practical approach to avoiding future wars. These were powerful
arguments that seem to presage the idea of self-determination as a peremp-
tory jus cogens norm. 4 1 But the strength of Wilson's convictions in 1918
and thereafter were not sufficient to transform self-determination into a
norm of positive international law. Prior to Wilson's time, self-
determination had never before been advanced as a legal principle, and
even Wilson himself seemed to be speaking more of ethical and practical
principle than of strict law.42 Wilson's reference to the "rights of small
38. See infra notes 51-62 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the post-World War II
decolonization model of self-determination.
39. WILSON'S 1918 ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 475 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
41. See infra notes 53-55 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the recognition of self-
determination as a norm ofjus cogens.
42. Without directly characterizing it as such, Wilson formulated a legal argument for the validity
of some of the principles he articulated in his 1918 speech to Congress and which are cited in this
Article. His assertion that these principles have been accepted and not objected to (except by extremists
in Germany and Austria) could be seen as an argument that they have been accepted by states as part of
positive international law.
A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed- Until such a peace can be
secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we re-
gard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the
spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else
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nations and of nationalities" and to the "rights of peoples" anticipates the
international law of human rights that was to come. Nonetheless, as befit-
ting a former professor of jurisprudence and politics, Wilson was careful
not to suggest that the ethical precept of self-determination was already part
of positive international law. Instead, he described self-determination as
"an imperative principle of action" not as an imperative legal principle. 43
There was political opposition to Wilson's ideas about self-
determination even within his own administration. Robert Lansing, Wil-
son's Secretary of State, would later go public with his extremely critical
view of the idea:
It is an evil thing to permit the phrase [self-determination] to continue to
dwell in the minds of men as expressing a principle having the apparent
sanction of the civilized world, when it has in fact been thoroughly dis-
credited and will always be cast aside whenever it comes in conflict with
national safety, with historic political rights or with economic interests
affecting the prosperity of the nation.
... The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which
can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it
is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who
failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to
put the principle in force. What a calamity the phrase was ever uttered!
What misery it will cause!
44
Whatever the political debate, there was a general consensus at the
time that self-determination was not a norm of positive international law. In
1920, the League of Nations established a Commission of Jurists to con-
sider legal aspects of the Aaland Islands question. 45 The report of that
Commission constitutes the most definitive legal analysis of self-
determination issues during the post-World War I era.
46
been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make
their voices audible.
WILSON'S 1918 ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 478 (emphasis added).
43. See id.
44. Pomerance, supra note 37, at 10 (citing Robert Lansing, Self-Determination, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Apr. 9, 1921, at 6-7, 101-02).
45. The Aaland Islands are inhabited by primarily Swedish speaking residents who had been
incorporated into Finland while it was subject to Russian rule and who took the occasion of Finland's
independence from Russia to press their claim to leave Finland to join Sweden. It emerged as an early
test of how to balance the emerging principle of self-determination with state sovereignty and other
interests.
46. A second political report was prepared soon thereafter by a Commission of Rapporteurs, based
on their visit to the Islands in question. Report of the Commission of Rapporleurs Presented to the
League of Nations Council, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921). That report focused on the
historical, political, and strategic particulars of the dispute. See ENVER HASANI, SELF-DETERMINATION,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA 87-88 (2003),
available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf-pool/publikationen/hasa03.pdf
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After noting that "the principle of self-determination of peoples plays
an important part in modem political thought," the Commission pointed
out that "there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions" and stressed that even the recognition of that principle in a number
of treaties of that era "cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the
same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations. '47 Instead, the
Commission stressed repeatedly that the sovereign rights of states, as well
as the need to protect the international community from the risks of insta-
bility, precluded any such right of secession.48
The Aaland Islands Commission of Jurists also stressed that many fac-
tors, other than the majority sentiment of the population, were relevant to
the question of whether demands for self-determination should in fact lead
to the transfer of sovereignty.49 As will be discussed below, the factors
identified by the Commission have continuing relevance to the application
of the principle today.
Soon after the status of the Aaland Islands was resolved in 1921,50 de-
velopment of the international law of self-determination came to a virtual
halt. It was a time when Germany, Italy, and Japan turned towards aggres-
sion or colonial expansion, or both. Only in the post-World War II era
would the issue of self-determination return to center stage.
47. The Commission also noted:
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important part in modem po-
litical thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that there is no mention
of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations- The recognition of this principle in a certain
number of international treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same
footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations.
Report of the International Committee (sic) of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations
with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects of the Aaland Islands question,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 5 (Oct. 1920) [hereinafter Commission of Jurists Re-
port] (emphasis added).
48. In the words of the Commission of Jurists:
Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determin-
ing its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of
the sovereignty of every State which is definitely constituted .... Any other solution would
amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creat-
ing difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea em-
bodied in the term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the international
community.
Id. at5.
49. Id. at 6,
50. The Aaland Islands question was resolved after the Council of the League of Nations decided
that sovereignty over the Islands would remain with Finland, subject to agreement between the parties
(Finland and Sweden), guaranteeing autonomy, demilitarization, and minority and language rights. See
The Aaland Islands Question, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 691, 699 (1921).
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2. The Post-WW 11 Decolonization Model of Self-Determination
After the Second World War, there was a renewed focus, both legal
and political, upon the principle of self-determination. Specifically, the
status of the principle as part of positive international law was solidified
when the UN Charter specifically referred to "respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples" in its statement of the pur-
poses of the UN. 51 Since then, self-determination has been characterized as
the essential foundation of all human rights. 52 The International Court of
Justice has recognized the principle of self-determination as "one of the
essential principles of contemporary international law," 53 as a peremptory
norm of international law,54 and as a right of an erga omnes character.
55
Moreover, the right of self-determination was codified into positive
international law in 1966 in Article I of both the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant for Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, thereby confirming the paramount status of that
principle in the new international law of human rights.5 6 More importantly,
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article I of the UN Charter states in part: "[tihe Purposes of the
United Nations are... [tlo develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace." Id. (emphasis added).
52. On this point, the Human Rights Committee stated:
The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essen-
tial condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for
the promotion and strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason that States set forth the
right of self-determination in a provision of positive law in both Covenants and placed this
provision as article I apart from and before all of the other rights in the two Covenants.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12, Art, I (Twenty-first session, 1984), Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/lI/Rev.l, at 12, para. 1 (1994), at http:/Iwww.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/-
f3c99406d528f37fc12563ed004960b4?Opendocument [hereinafter Human Rights Committee General
Comment No. 12].
53, Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).
54. See also id; Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, Report of the
International Law Commission: Commentary to Article 26, Compliance with Peremptory Norms, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 208, U.N. Doe. A/56110 (2001) [hereinafter Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission].
55. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102.
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [here-
inafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic Rights]. The identical
Article I of each of these treaties reads as follows:
I. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development-
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and re-
sources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and intemational law. In
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
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the snowballing process of decolonization, during the course of which vir-
tually all colonies gained independence from colonial powers, left no doubt
that a new era of self-determination through decolonization had arrived.
57
Once again, there were limits upon the application of the principle.
Foremost among these was the tendency to limit the right of self-
determination to peoples suffering under so-called "salt-water colonial-
ism,"58 i.e., those geographically separated from the colonial power by the
sea. 59 The new states gaining independence through the process of decolo-
nization were every bit as dedicated to preserving their sovereignty and
territorial integrity as other States had been before them. 60 They became
willing collaborators in efforts to redefine self-determination so as to pre-
clude secession altogether, strictly limiting it to the context of decoloniza-
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility
for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote
the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
57. Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over eighty former colonies have gained
their independence from European colonial powers in a process of decolonization that has transformed
the international system. Most of these new states achieved independence during the heyday of decolo-
nization in the 1950s and 1960s. See United Nations Department of Public Information, Historical
Background on Decolonization, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonizationlhistory.htm (last visited
Nov. 4, 2004).
58. Joel Ngugi, The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples
in Post-Colonial Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 297, 304 n.28 (2002). As one
commentator noted:
As a result of pressure from the United States and the then USSR, United Nations Resolution
1541 was passed which established guidelines for deeming a territory to be a colony in need
of United Nations assistance to promote its right of self-determination. Under this resolution,
classical decolonization applied only to territories that met the "salt water" theory of colonial-
ism. The geographic separateness of overseas colonies, regionally and continentally distant
from the metropolitan areas of the colonizing countries was a necessary condition of colonial-
ism and therefore of a territory's status as a "colony" with a right to self-determination. Dur-
ing the debate on the declaration, Belgium argued that this should not be limited to colonies
and protectorates separated by water.
Id.
59. UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 sets out the principles to be applied to determine
whether reports on the status of non-self-governing territories are required to be filed under Article
73(c) of the UN Charter. The threshold consideration is defined as "[pirimafacie there is an obligation
to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethni-
cally and/or culturally from the country administering it."
G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
60. As Cassese put it:
[Dieveloping countries, with the full support of socialist States and without any opposition
from Western countries, firmly believed that colonial boundaries should not be modified, lest
this would trigger the disruption of many colonial countries, as well as serious disorder as a
result of the carving up of old States into new. In short, the principle of uti possidetis was re-
garded as paramount ... These geopolitical considerations led States actually to deny the
right of self-determination to individual ethnic groups within colonial territories.
CASSESE, supra note 30, at 72-73,
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tion.61 This effectively prevented invocation of the principle against the
territorial integrity,62 or other sovereignty-based interests, of the new states
emerging from decolonization.
3. The Post-Cold War Model
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia
launched a new, post-Cold War era of self-determination, and it is in the
context of this era that the final status of Kosovo must now be determined.
In recent years, much of the debate regarding self-determination has
related to the international community's criteria for recognizing new states.
Since so many new states have emerged in Europe as a result of the disin-
tegration of the USSR and the former Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that
the EC (predecessor to today's EU) took the lead in setting these policies
on recognition. In 1991, the EC decided to convene a peace conference on
Yugoslavia, and established an Arbitration Commission (the "Badinter
Commission") to help resolve differences relating to the Yugoslav crisis.
63
Soon thereafter, in a Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recogni-
tion of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," the EC and
its Member states "confirm[ed] their attachment to the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act... in particular the principle of self-determination.
'64
At the same time, respect for human rights, especially minority rights, was
set out as a fundamental prerequisite for recognition by the EC. 65 The
Badinter Commission proceeded to issue opinions on a number of legal
questions relating to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the rec-
ognition of its former federal units, all of which applied EC guidelines
requiring, as a condition of recognition of new states, "guarantees for the
61. As one commentator has noted:
Secession was thought to have enormous disruptive potential in the emerging post-colonial
states. Thus, the definition of self-determination evolved so as to preclude secession, one of
its own natural outcomes. Secession's perceived threat to peace and security, as well as to the
integrity of individual states meant that it had to be distinguished from the more general right
of self-determination.
Second, the developing definition of self-determination became inextricably intertwined with
the decolonization movement. Self-determination, a concept recognized as a fruitful avenue
through which the independence of colonies might be achieved, soon came to be identified
exclusively with the process of decolonization.
Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 255, 264-65 (1996).
62. According to the Canadian Supreme Court, "[T]he exercise of such a right must be sufficiently
limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between
sovereign states." Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998] S.C.R. 217, 282.
63. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1488-89 (Introductory Note by Maurizio
Ragazzi).
64. EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1486-87.
65. Id. at 1487.
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rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the
commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE.
''66
From the beginning, the need to protect minority rights has been a
critical factor in the application of the principle of self-determination. To-
day, in the postcolonial era of human rights, this issue looms larger than
ever. The formal linkage of diplomatic recognition to guarantees about the
rights and treatment of minorities 67 is evidence of this trend, and is highly
relevant to both the legal and the political aspects of Kosovo's claim for
self-determination.
B. Ambiguities Inherent in the Concept of Self-Determination
1. Defining a People
Perhaps the greatest confusion concerning the principle of self-
determination concerns the fundamental question of to whom it applies.
According to the two International Covenants, "[a]ll peoples have the right
of self-determination. ' 68 The question is who qualifies as a "people." The
meaning of this term remains uncertain even after years of state practice
with claims of self-determination and the incorporation of this concept into
numerous international conventions. 69
66. Id.; see infra notes 128-37 and the accompanying text (further discussing this Commission
and its opinions).
67. The EC explicitly linked recognition of new Balkan states to a number of factors:
The Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to the principles of the Hel-
sinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular the principle of self-determination. They
affirm their readiness to recognise, subject to the normal standards of international practice
and the political realities in each case, those new states which, following the historic changes
in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropri-
ate interational obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful proc-
ess and to negotiations.
Therefore, they adopt a common position on the process of recognition of these new states,
which requires:
* respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commit-
ments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, espe-
cially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
* guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in ac-
cordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
* respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful
means and by common agreement.
EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1486-87 (emphasis added).
68. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 56, at art. 1; Covenant on Economic
Rights, supra note 56, at art. I.
69. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated "as the right to self-determination has developed by
virtue of a combination of international agreements and conventions, coupled with state practice, with
little formal elaboration of the definition of 'peoples', the result has been that the precise meaning of the
term 'people' remains somewhat uncertain." Reference re Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] S.C.R. at 281.
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There are clear reasons for this uncertainty. If the right of self-
determination were to be applied broadly to every conceivable group and
subgroup, it might destabilize and even threaten to fragment every state,
hastening the calamity feared by US Secretary of State Robert Lansing in
1921.70 In a more recent, and moderate, expression of this same concern,
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared that:
The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious
or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to frag-
mentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would
become ever more difficult to achieve.
7 1
While it is easy to understand the need to limit the application of the
concept, it is important not to limit it too much. Too narrow and concrete a
definition of a "people" would rob the concept of self-determination of any
effective value, a real concern in the present postcolonial era when little
salt-water colonialism is left to remedy. It would be a shame to vitiate what
has been described as "the only right with any real prestige or legitimacy in
international law that might be usefully employed to protect group
rights, '72 (as opposed to the individual rights of minority group
members).
73
One commentator has described the entire doctrine of self-
determination as "ridiculous because the people cannot decide until some-
body decides who are the people."'74 This is no small point. As the follow-
ing two examples illustrate, on those rare occasions when courts or
international bodies have been asked to decide whether a group truly con-
stituted a "people" with the right of self-determination, they have often
avoided the issue. When asked if the Serbian population of Croatia and
70. See Pomerance, supra note 37, at 10 (citing Robert Lansing, Self-Determination, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Apr. 9, 1921, at 6-7, 101-02).
71. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 (1992), at
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.
72. Simpson, supra note 61, at 258 n.17.
73. Most internationally recognized human rights, such as rights to life, liberty, security, freedom
of thought and speech, and freedoms from torture and arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, are held by
individuals. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 56, at arts. 6, 7, 9, 17, 18, 19. In
contrast, the right of self-determination is held not by individuals, but by "peoples." Id. at art. 1.
74. As Sir Ivor Jennings noted:
Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also President of the United
States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely
accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot
decide until somebody decides who are the people.




Bosnia-Hercegovina had the right to self-determination, Europe's Badinter
Commission issued an opinion that conceded the uncertainty surrounding
the scope and meaning of that right under positive international law, 75 and
stressed that the more straightforward rights of minorities under interna-
tional human rights law must surely apply.76 That opinion offered no direct
answer to the question of whether the right of self-determination itself ap-
plied.77 When asked whether Quebec had a unilateral right of secession
under national or international law, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a
similar evasion, answered that it did not, without offering any conclusion
on whether the population of Quebec could be legally characterized as a
people.
78
2. Does a "People" really have a right to external self-determination?
One major concern is that the idea of self-determination raises such
high and often unrealistic expectations. If designation as a people implies
the right to independence and statehood, then extending that status too
broadly could indeed threaten international peace and stability.
In practice, the principle of self-determination has never guaranteed an
automatic right to statehood or other forms of external self-determination.
Both of the international human rights covenants define self-determination
in terms attainable within the framework of an existing state,79 and in prac-
tice that right will usually be fulfilled through such an internal frame-
work. 80 The default availability of internal self-determination is the
effective core of the right, leaving independence, secession, or other exter-
nal forms of self-determination as an extraordinary remedy. The right to
75. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, 1498 ("The Commission considers that
international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-
determination." (Badinter Opinion No. 2)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1497-99.
78. The court decided only the narrow issue of the right to secession while noting:
While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics (such as a
common language and culture) that would be considered in determining whether a specific
group is a "people", as do other groups within Quebec and/or Canada, it is not necessary to
explore this legal characterization to resolve Question 2 appropriately. Similarly, it is not nec-
essary for the Court to determine whether, should a Quebec people exist within the definition
of public international law, such a people encompasses the entirety of the provincial popula-
tion or just a portion thereof. Nor is it necessary to examine the position of the aboriginal
population within Quebec. As the following discussion of the scope of the right to self-
determination will make clear, whatever be the correct application of the definition of peo-
ple(s) in this context, their right of self-determination cannot in the present circumstances be
said to ground a right to unilateral secession-
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. at 281-82-
79. Id. at 284.
80. Id. at 282.
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internal self-determination should be applied to as many groups as possible,
but there can be no right to external self-determination where it would
threaten fundamental human rights or undermine international peace and
security. Thus, an array of factors must be considered on a case-by-case
basis when evaluating any claim of a right to external self-determination.
As briefly discussed earlier,8 1 one case in which a right to external
self-determination is generally recognized involves cases of colonial peo-
ples breaking away from an imperial power.8 2 Another special case in
which the right to self-determination may be claimed is "where a people is
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial
context." 83 A case could perhaps be made that this second situation applies
to Kosovo, but both the principle and its application to Kosovo are disput-
able. There are, however a number of other more compelling arguments to
be made for the independence of Kosovo. These will be examined a bit
later.
C. Possible Forms of Self-Determination for Kosovo
Let us assume, for now, that the population of Kosovo, in whole or in
part, does consist of a people possessed of the right to self-determination.
There can be no question in this case of denying them this right. The prin-
ciple of self-determination stands at the top of the normative hierarchy as it
has been recognized by the International Court of Justice as a peremptory
norm of international law. 84 The question that remains, and that must now
be considered, is how that right might be satisfied.
85
81. See supra notes 58-60 and the accompanying text.
82. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. at 285 ("The right of colonial peoples to
exercise their right to self-determination by breaking away from the 'imperial' power is now undis-
puted, but is irrelevant to this Reference.").
83. Id.
84. See also East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102; Report of the International Law Commission, supra
note 54, at 208.
85. Although a full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that in
realizing the right of self-determination of a group such as the Albanian majority in Kosovo, minority
rights must be provided for as well. Minority rights have emerged as being of particular concern after
the many troubling instances of crimes against humanity and even genocide seen around the world in
recent years. In many ways, the issue of minority rights is not fundamentally different from that of other
human rights. Those in the minority, like those in the majority, have unalienable human rights erga
omnes, which the state, the government, the majority, and others must respect. Regardless of whether
Kosovo gains independence, autonomy, or some other status, international norms will demand respect
for the rights of minorities in Kosovo.
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1. Independence and Sovereignty
The formation of an independent state would, of course, constitute the
most complete realization of external self-determination for Kosovo. An-
other external possibility, less likely and rarely discussed, would be the
union of Kosovo with Albania. As there appears to be little if any political
support for directly proceeding with this solution, we can dismiss this pos-
sibility.86 If the people of Kosovo are to achieve full external self-
determination it will come first in the form of independence and
sovereignty.
But sovereignty for Kosovo can only be obtained at the expense of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. Given that the Security
Council has called for a solution based on "the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [including Serbia], '87 this
will be a difficult goal to achieve regardless of the merits of Kosovo's case
for independence. The likelihood of achieving this goal through decision of
the Security Council is less than that of achieving it through direct negotia-
tion with Serbia.88
2. Reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia
At the opposite and minimal extreme, self-determination for Kosovars
might, in theory, be achieved solely within the internal framework of Ser-
bia. Considering the past fifteen years of violence between Serbia and the
Albanians who constitute the majority population of Kosovo, the possibil-
ity of full reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia seems to have little practical
viability. Not only would Kosovar Albanians find this to be unacceptable, it
would be equally difficult, in practice, for Serbia to implement ana accept
such a development.
3. Intermediate Possibilities, Including Autonomy and the Status Quo
Between the extremes of independence and reintegration into Serbia,
any number of intermediate arrangements might be possible. One of the
principal alternatives would be a special regime of autonomy for Kosovo.
86. There has been some concern around the world that independence for Kosovo might eventu-
ally lead to the creation of a "Greater Albania" joining Albania, Kosovo, and other Albanian-inhabited
areas into one state. This is regarded by many Balkan Slavs, such as Serbs and Macedonians, as a
nightmare scenario to be avoided at all costs. See Carlotta Gall, Crisis in the Balkans: The Separatists:
Rebels Describe an Officer's Life in the Struggle Over Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at A10.
87. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3, 1, Annexes 1-2. The FRY changed its name to "Serbia and
Montenegro" on February 4, 2003. See Daniel Simpson, Yugoslavia is Again Reinvented, in Name and
Structure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A3.
88. See discussion of the politics of the Security Council infra notes 113-23.
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Security Council resolutions on Kosovo have repeatedly expressed support
for "an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially
greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration." 89 If a
decision of Kosovo's status is left to the Security Council, it might endorse
autonomy as the best apparent compromise simply because it could thereby
appear to address Albanian demands for self-determination without com-
promising the territorial integrity of Serbia. But since autonomy is a fairly
broad concept, much would depend upon the specific details. In the best-
case scenario, autonomy might represent a lesser or partial model of exter-
nal self-determination in the sense that Kosovo could become de facto in-
dependent without gaining formal independence. In the worst or weakest
case, autonomy for Kosovo might not be substantially different from rein-
tegration into Serbia. The international community established a successful
regime of autonomy as a key part of the solution to the Aaland Islands
question in 1921, averting a possible war between Sweden and Finland. 90
Accordingly, the Aaland Islands model might be of some use in exploring
options for Kosovo.
Another possibility might be the continued administration of Kosovo
as an international protectorate moving towards self-government. UNMIK,
the international administration established by Security Council Resolution
1244, has made progress in its stated goals of providing transitional ad-
ministration, ensuring conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all in-
habitants of Kosovo, and overseeing the development of democratic
provisional institutions of self-government. 9 1 It has made little progress,
however, in facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's future
status,92 and after five years of UN interim administration, there has been
some disappointment and disillusionment on all sides.
93
Although transitional administration has helped to prepare Kosovo for
self-government, it will be impossible to realize the Security Council's
89. S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 1, 5, see also S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3930th mtg., U.N.
Doe. S/RES/1 199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998);
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3 (reaffirming in the preambular paragraphs the language from Security
Council Resolution 1160).
90. See MICHAEL EMERSON, THE WIDER EUROPE AS TIE EUROPEAN UNION'S FRIENDLY
MONROE DOCTRINE 3 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 27, Oct. 27, 2002), at
http://www.ipp.md/publieations/Emerson.doc.
91. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3, I 10, 11 (a), 1 (c).
92. Id. 11 (e).
93. Misha Glenny, The Forgotten Land: Violence is Bound to Escalate if the UN 's New Repre-
sentative in Kosovo Fails to Get the International Community to Deliver Support, GUARDIAN (London),
June 22, 2004, at 17 ("[l]n the past three years, Albanian joy has turned into resentment. Serb bitterness
has deepened. The UN, with a creditable record in peace-keeping, has proved hopelessly inadequate at
governing a complex society like Kosovo.").
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stated goal of "autonomy and meaningful self-administration" 94 so long as
UNMIK retains ultimate authority over Kosovo's Provisional Institutions
of Self-Government. Generally speaking, interim administration should be
kept to a minimum, but if the parties cannot reach agreement on final po-
litical status, the UN might fall back on continued international administra-
tion as an even more extended interim solution.
A rather bizarre possibility, once reportedly favored by the US gov-
ernment, would be to transform Kosovo into a separate republic within a
Yugoslav Federal Republic. 95 This solution would likely be opposed by
Serbia, as an interference in its domestic jurisdiction, and by Montenegro,
which would find itself more tightly tied to Serbia. 96 The only real appeal
of such an arrangement to Kosovar Albanians is that it might be a step to-
wards eventual independence following the model of former Yugoslav
republics Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, which
have effectively seceded.
Many of the intermediate possibilities discussed here, if implemented
in the short term, might possibly lead, in the long term, to the formal inde-
pendence of Kosovo.
Ill. CAN ANYONE SOLVE THE PROBLEM?: PATHS TO THE REALIZATION OF
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR Kosovo
A. The Possibility of a Negotiated Solution
While it is tempting to conclude that only international institutions can
settle the issue of Kosovo's final status, there is another, potentially sim-
pler, path to a solution: if the parties involved, most importantly, Serbia and
Kosovar Albanians, can reach a negotiated agreement on final status, there
will be no need for the UN Security Council to decide the question. With
94. See S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 1, 5.
95. According to an Associated Press report focusing on US policy towards the region, a senior
Western diplomat suggested that "the Western plan for Kosovo ... would make Kosovo, a southern
Serbian province, into a full-fledged third Yugoslav republic. 'Kosovo does not want to remain part of
Serbia, that is clear,' said a senior Western diplomat. 'But Kosovo could become part of a new Yugo-
slavia."' See U.S. Removes Support for Independent Montenegro, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2000, at 7.
96. Monitenegro itself aspires to independence from union with Serbia, and any restored union of
Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro would have the opposite effect of tying it once again to Serbia. See
World Briefing Europe: Montenegro: The New (Old) Flag Is Unfurled, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at
A4 (noting that "in 2002, Montenegro agreed to shelve plans for independence and for at least three
years stay with Serbia in the loose union that became the successor to Yugoslavia. But Montenegrin
leaders say they intend to go ahead with a referendum on independence, possibly in 2006.").
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this in mind, the Council has repeatedly called upon the parties to negotiate
the issue without preconditions. 97 So far, negotiations have failed.98
Kosovar Albanians reject the idea of reintegration into Serbia and tend
to insist that only external self-determination, in the form of an independent
and sovereign Kosovo, will satisfy them. But only Serbia, as the de jure
sovereign in Kosovo, has the unquestioned power to authorize the neces-
sary transfer of sovereignty. Serbia is naturally reluctant to cede sover-
eignty or control, but if the independence or autonomy of Kosovo must
eventually be accepted, Serbs may demand territorial adjustments that
would alter the boundary between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia. Kosovar
Albanians generally oppose this idea because they want self-determination
for Kosovo within its historical boundaries. Traditionally, historical borders
have been considered to be sacrosanct, according to the principle of uti
possidetis. If, as is likely, the Security Council adheres to this view, com-
promise on the border will be possible only with the agreement of both
parties, and of the local populations that would be affected. 99 Unless one
assumes that the Security Council will take responsibility for imposing
compromise (which it is understandably reluctant to do), each party's con-
sent and cooperation remains essential to achieving some of the most fun-
damental objectives of the other.
97. See S.C. Res. i 160, supra note 1, 4. Security Council Resolution 1160 "[c]alls upon the
authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community urgently to enter without
preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues, and notes the readiness of the Con-
tact Group to facilitate such a dialogue." Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 89, 3 (reaffirming
language); S.C. Res. 1203, supra note 89, 5 (reaffirming language); EC Declaration & Guidelines,
supra note 18.
98. The following description of what passes for "negotiations" between Kosovo and Serbia
indicates why there has been no progress so far.
The actual meeting may have been something of an anticlimax. But substantive talk was not
the real point of this week's encounter in Vienna between the Serbian government and leaders
of the breakaway province of Kosovo.... Getting Kosovo's president, Ibrahim Rugova, in
the same room as Serbia's prime minister, Zoran Zivkovic, was a big step. The UN billed the
meeting as a "direct dialogue", but Mr. Zivkovic commented sharply that "there was no dia-
logue, especially not a direct one." The three-hour meeting produced some agreements: to set
up bilateral working groups on transport and communications, on the return of (mostly Serb)
refugees, on missing people (mostly ethnic Albanians) and on energy.
Although the meeting was held behind closed doors, an aide to the Kosovo delegation re-
ported later that the two sides had simply read out prepared statements.... The Serbs also as-
serted that Kosovo was a province of Serbia and Montenegro; the Kosovo delegation retorted
that "the independence of Kosovo is an irreversible process."
Serbia and Kosovo: Unfriendly Fire, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 52-53.
99. Cassese notes that the principle of uti possidetis trumps the principle of self-determination
when it comes to the demarcation of borders. Nonetheless, he notes that there is an exception where
"two former colonial countries or secessionist States decide to modify their borders by mutual arrange-
ment. If this happens, the agreement must be consonant with the wishes of the population concerned."
See CASSESE, supra note 30, at 193.
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Furthermore, the two possible means of achieving progress on the fi-
nal status issue, i.e., direct negotiations and, mobilization of international
support, should be viewed together rather than as separate alternative ap-
proaches. The world is watching and will evaluate whether each side has
made sincere efforts to come to an agreement. The nature and depth of
international support for the alternative Albanian Kosovar and Serbian
positions on final status will depend upon whether each is seen to be engag-
ing in a meaningful dialogue on political status issues. If one party is seen
as setting unrealistic preconditions precluding meaningful dialogue on the
issue, that party risks losing support among the permanent members of the
Security Council who may ultimately be called upon to decide the issue.
It is undeniably true that sovereignty is a notoriously difficult matter
to negotiate, but, as will be discussed immediately below, Kosovo's
chances of achieving independence and statehood through decision of the
Security Council are no greater than the chances of achieving it through
direct negotiation with Serbia. As James Crawford has noted, during the
twentieth century, more states were created with the consent of the former
sovereign than through forced secession.1 00
B. Does the Security Council have the legal authority to award sover-
eignty to Kosovo?
There is nothing in the UN Charter that anticipates that the Security
Council, or any other UN body, might take territory from one sovereign
state and award it to a new one. Quite to the contrary, the UN Charter af-
firms the sovereign equality of states, prohibits the threat or use of force
against their territorial integrity, and affirms that, as a general rule, the UN
is not to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state. 10 1 There is, of course, one important exception: the
rule banning the UN from interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of states
"shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII"02 of the UN Charter. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the
power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, and to make such decisions as are necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 103 The decisions of the
100. CRAWFORD, supra note 35, at 247 ("Until this century, secession was certainly the most
conspicuous, as well as the most usual, method of the creation of new States.... In this century, new
States have been more often created with the consent of the former sovereign, especially of course in
the colonial situation.").
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, 4, 7.
102. Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
103. Articles 39-42 of the U.N. Charter provide as follows:
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Security Council under the Charter are binding upon its member states.
104
Does the UN Charter therefore give the Security Council what may be
called "international dispositive powers," i.e., the right to decide upon terri-
torial changes, statehood, and sovereignty and to award independence to
Kosovo?'0 5
Historical precedents from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
suggest that the great powers have often assumed international dispositive
powers, although they may, in some cases, simply have been exercising
their powers of persuasion to bring about a settlement between the parties,
and, in others, were acting extralegally. 106 Judge McNair once suggested
that great power intervention in matters of territory or status is simply
something that happens from time to time.1
07
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desir-
able. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of
the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with
such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of commrunica-
tion, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be in-
adequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may in-
clude demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.
Id at arts. 39-42.
104. Id. at art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.").
105. James Crawford defines these international dispositive powers as "certain international powers
or capacities to bring about territorial change, and to create new States or entities approximating to
States, with effects extending beyond the immediate contracting parties." CRAWFORD, supra note 35, at
301.
106. For the most comprehensive treatment of these historical cases, see id. at 301-34.
107. He candidly observed that:
From time to time it happens that a group of great Powers, or a large number of States both
great and small, assume a power to create by a multipartite treaty some new international re-
gime or status, which soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability extending beyond
the limits of the actual contracting parties, and giving it objective existence. This power is
used when some public interest is involved, and its exercise often occurs in the course of the
peace settlement at the end of a great war.
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Sweeping prerogatives were exercised in the nineteenth century by the
great powers of that time acting within the loose framework of the Concert
of Europe. 10 8 Their use of these powers often showed only minimal regard
for the rights of smaller states. 109 No one would argue today for a return to
such practices because they are inconsistent with the purposes and princi-
ples of the UN Charter.1 10 Nonetheless, should negotiations fail, the power
to address the situation in Kosovo must be sought elsewhere. When acting
to maintain or to restore international peace and security, the Security
Council has very broad authority."'1 This authority could potentially be
used to confer sovereignty upon the Kosovar people in the territory of Kos-
ovo, if applied consistently with the right to self-determination and other
principles of the UN Charter. 
112
C. Political Aspect: The Reluctance of UN Members to Impose External
Decisions on Issues of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
1. Historical Perspectives
James Crawford's comprehensive survey of UN practice involving in-
ternational dispositive powers led him to the following conclusion:
No other significant powers of territorial administration or disposition
have been delegated to United Nations organs since 1945. The record,
such as it is, demonstrates that the difficulties with such delegations
derive not from any assumed incompetence of the United Nations to
exercise dispositive powers, but from the political feasibility of the
particular situation. 113
Undeniably, the key impediments to a Security Council decision es-
tablishing the independence of Kosovo are political rather than legal, but
that does not make them any less formidable. The great powers, such as the
International Status of South-West Afica, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 153 (July I1) (separate opinion of Judge
McNair).
108. See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 26 (4th ed. 1971).
109. Speaking of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe Inis Claude, Jr. noted that "[tlhis he-
gemony of the powerful had its seamy side, as all dictatorships must. If it is true of individuals, it is
surely even more true of states, that possession of extraordinary power and authority leads to abuse and
selfish exploitation." Id. at 25 26.
110. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. One of the purposes of the United nations is "[to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal tights and self-
determination of peoples." id. The Charter also states that "[tihe organization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Id. at art. 2, pars. 1.
11. See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, A.C., at para. 31 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction].
112. CRAWFORD, supra note 35, at 329.
113. Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
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permanent members of the Security Council, have historically avoided
directly imposing dispositive territorial solutions. They much prefer to
persuade disputing parties to consent to settle their differences. Crawford's
review of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe's dispositions con-
cludes with a very relevant political observation:
In general, the dispositions referred to above, though concluded under
the aegis of the "Concert of Europe," were consented to by parties af-
fected: the actual exercise of authority by the powers-with certain ex-
ceptions-did not in fact extend beyond negotiation, conciliation and the
exercise of political influence between disputants.
114
This pattern has continued to hold even in the most politically charged
circumstances. 115 The independence of East Timor and its secession from
Indonesia followed a popular consultation on August 30, 1999, in which
the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence, and was based
on the decision of the Indonesian People's Consultative Council to accept
that independence.' 16 A subsequent Security Council resolution established
the UNTAET (the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) as a
transitional mechanism, but did not impose a UN solution." 17
The ultimate political status of Kosovo will likely be determined by
negotiation, conciliation, and the exercise of political influence upon and
between the disputants rather than by a decision imposed by the Security
Council. This political process has already begun, as evidenced by the deci-
sions of both the UN Security Council and the EU discussed in the follow-
ing section.
2. Politics of the Current Security Council
The Security Council operates within the legal framework of the UN
Charter and the political framework of its other organs, including the Gen-
114. Id, at 305 (emphasis added).
115. Iraq's Saddam Hussein invoked a territorial dispute to justify the invasion of Kuwait, which
led to the 1991 Gulf War. After that war, the Security Council called for a technical demarcation of the
agreed boundary between the two countries, but did not, as is sometimes suggested, impose territorial
concessions upon Iraq. The technical demarcation was conducted based on a 1963 boundary treaty
between the two parties and was therefore not a dispositive decision. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR,
2981st mtg. at pmbl., 3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/687 (1991) (calling for the U.N. Secretary-General to create
what would become the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission); S.C. Res. 833, U.N.
SCOR, 3224th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/833 (1993) (reaffirming that the decisions of the Commis-
sion regarding the demarcation of the boundary are final). In this case, the Council did impose a particu-
lar method of dispute settlement between two sovereign states.
116. Free At Last, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 21, 1999, at 16.
117. See S.C. Res. 1272, 4057th mtg. at pmbl., 4, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) (establish-
ing the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor). This resolution welcomes "the decision of the
Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly" to accept East Timor's independence, and reaffirms
"respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia." Id at pmbl.; see also Christopher S.
Wren, U.N. Creates an Authority to Start Governing East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at AS.
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eral Assembly. Because of this formalized legal structure, the Security
Council will be much more reluctant to impose a solution than were the
great powers acting as the Concert of Europe. It would be extremely con-
troversial for the Security Council to grant statehood to Kosovo at the ex-
pense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. There would
inevitably be legal questions about whether such an action was consistent
with the principles set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter, questions about
whether other members of the UN agreed with the precedent being set, and
debates about whether the consequences of the decision would truly pro-
mote international peace and security.
Other than the general requirement that Security Council decisions be
consistent with the Charter and its principles, the UN Charter itself recog-
nizes few limits upon the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council. "18 A
practical and political constraint lies in the Security Council's desire to
maintain the support of its members and of the other organs of the UN. An
international decision to compromise the territorial integrity of a state
might well be viewed as illegitimate unless it was based on principles 119
supported by a broad international consensus. That consensus will not be
easy to come by. UN members are all territorially defined sovereign states
themselves, and are naturally reluctant to compromise a fundamental aspect
of the sovereignty they enjoy. Insofar as these attitudes reflect opiniojuris,
they are relevant to the development of the applicable international law as
well.
Security Council Resolution 1244 speaks of what is to be done "pend-
ing a final settlement" and of "facilitating a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future status, ' 120 but the Resolution carefully avoids
endorsing any particular form of final status. This directly reflects the re-
luctance of the Security Council to decide the issue. 
12 1
Much the same attitude is reflected in UN Security Council resolu-
tions on Kosovo, which call for a political dialogue on political status is-
sues leading to a solution based on the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 122 and by the repeated references to "the sover-
118. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
119. President Woodrow Wilson stressed that territorial settlements should not be based merely on
political expediency: "every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and
for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of
claims amongst rival states." WILSON'S 1918 ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 478 (emphasis
added).
120. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3, 1 (a), 11 (e).
121. Id. l(a).
122. See id. at 5, Annexes 1-2; S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 1, 1.
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eignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
found in the Rambouillet Agreement.
123
Kosovo has supporters on the Security Council but so does Serbia.
124
In light of the Russian veto, Kosovo's chances of achieving independence
and statehood through decision of the Security Council may be no greater
than the chances of achieving it through direct negotiation with Serbia. 
125
3. The Evolving Practice of New State Recognition and its Relevance to
Kosovo's Final Political Status
The recognition of new states raises issues of both international law
and politics. The principles of public international law establish the essen-
tial conditions of statehood, namely a defined territory and a permanent
population, with both subject to an organized government with effective
control. 126 Whether these conditions have been met is a question of fact.
The prevailing view is that recognition by other states is merely evidence
that they presumably believe those conditions have been met.127 In princi-
ple, recognition by other states is only declaratory and is not a formal and
separate condition of statehood.
128
In the past, recognition, or nonrecognition, has been dependent upon
the recognizing state's assessment both of whether the above conditions
have been met de facto, and of whatever political considerations it might
123. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, art. 1, 2, Feb. 23, 1999,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/euriksvoram-
bouillet text.html [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. The Rambouillet Accords were a three-year
interim agreement on Kosovo, brokered by the US, Russia, and the EU. Id. They were intended to
provide democratic self-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo. Id. These
Accords were signed by representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community in February of 1999, but
Serbia refused to sign them, triggering the NATO bombing of Serbia. Id-
124. The US, the UK, and France demonstrated their support for Kosovo by participating in the
NATO bombing of Serbia. Russia's sympathies lie with their Slavic brethren, the Serbs. See Michael R.
Gordon, U.S. Warns Russia: Don't Provide Help to Serbian Military, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, at Al
("Russian nationalist and Communist politicians have expressed support for the Serbs and little sympa-
thy for the plight of the Kosovar Albanians, whom they view as Muslim separatists.").
125. Russia and China have both threatened to use the veto to defend Serbia in the past. See Steven
Erlanger, Yugoslavs Demand a Role in U.N. Kosovo Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1999, at A7
("NATO began its air attacks on Yugoslavia without a Security Council resolution, insisting that its
actions were legally founded in the right of 'humanitarian intervention.' But NATO officials knew that
they could not get such a Security Council resolution, because Russia and China said they would veto
one.").
126. "Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage
in, formal relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1986).
127. Id. § 201 cmt. h.
128. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1495 (Badinter Opinion No. 1).
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also care to consider. 129 No state is required to accord formal recognition to
any other state. 130 Traditionally, recognition of a new state on territory still
claimed by another existing state would only be justified if effective control
had passed from one to the other. 131
The EU's recent practice concerning recognition of the new Balkan
states indicates that, increasingly, an emergent state's compliance with
various legal obligations in the past and its willingness to uphold interna-
tional legal and political obligations in the future are considered relevant to
decisions regarding recognition. 132 The EC's 1991 Declaration on the
"Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union" set the tone for these changes. 133
The Badinter Commission's opinions reveal much about the views of
the EU on matters related to Kosovo's final status. In particular, these opin-
129. The failure of Arab states to recognize the state of Israel, for example, is based on purely
political considerations, unrelated to the defacto existence of that state.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN LAW OF T1HE UNITED STATES, supra note 126, § 202.
131. Recognition may be withheld for political reasons, but should not be granted for any reason
when the qualifications of statehood have not been met.
Treating an unqualified entity as a state will ordinarily affect the interests of another state. For
example, accepting as a state an entity that seeks to secede from another state, but has not yet
succeeded in achieving complete control of its territory, is an improper interference in the in-
temal affairs of the parent state, and if the seceding entity is given military support, may con-
stitute the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of the parent state in violation
of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
Id. at § 202 cmt. f.
132. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 62, at 289.
The process of recognition, once considered to be an exercise of pure sovereign discretion,
has come to be associated with legal norms .... [A]n emergent state that has disregarded le-
gitimate obligations arising out of its previous situation can potentially expect to be hindered
by that disregard in achieving international recognition, at least with respect to the timing of
that recognition. On the other hand, compliance by the seceding province with such legitimate
obligations would weigh in favour of international recognition.
Id.
133. The common position of the EC states sets the following requirements:
* respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commit-
ments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, espe-
cially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
* guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accor-
dance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
* respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful
means and by common agrecment;
" acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;
* commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to
arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes.
The Community and its Member States will not recognise entities which are the result of ag-
gression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring states.
The commitments to these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community and its
Member States and to the establishment of diplomatic relations. It could be laid down in
agreements.
EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1487.
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ions demonstrate the EU's commitment to the principle that the external
frontiers of Serbia and of other former Yugoslav republics must be re-
spected and may not be altered, except by freely negotiated agreement.
134
Consistent with this view, the Commission declined even to consider Kos-
ovo' s request for diplomatic recognition.1
35
The Badinter Commission found that the former Yugoslavia was in
the process of dissolution as of November 29, 1991.136 The Commission
also found that as of July 4, 1992, that process was complete and the old
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could no longer be said to ex-
ist. 137 Since a federal state was deemed to have dissolved, this opened the
door to the recognition of former federal units Croatia, Slovenia, Mace-
donia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina without violating the sanctity of external
frontiers.
The fact that four former Yugoslav republics have already achieved
independence and statehood might suggest that Kosovo can expect the
same. Leaping to such a conclusion, however, would be both naive and
simplistic. Specific historical circumstances distinguish these territories
from Kosovo. In the early 1990s, when the former Yugoslav republics had
already gained a degree of defacto independence from the SFRY and were
recognized as independent states, Kosovo was part of Serbia, still effec-
tively under Serbian rule, and therefore was not in a position to claim rec-
ognition as a state.
Kosovo's status within the SFRY has long been a source of tension.
Formally classified as a Serbian Province, Kosovo was never granted full
status as a republic within the SFRY, even though it enjoyed a high degree
of functional autonomy by the 1970s.138 Amendments to Serbia's constitu-
tion in 1989 and 1990 effectively negated that autonomy, prompting Kos-
ovo's provincial assembly to issue a declaration of independence from
Serbia on July 2, 1990, and another declaration of independence from the
SFRY on October 18, 1991.139 Kosovo's request for recognition by the EC
134. When asked "Can the internal boundaries borders between Croatia and Serbia and between
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?" the
Badinter Commission answered "First-All external frontiers must be respected .... Second-The
boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia, and possibly between
other adjacent independent States may not be altered except by agreement freely arrived at." Arbitration
Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1499-1500 (Badinter Opinion No. 3).
135. See infra notes 140-41 and the accompanying text.
136. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1497 (Badinter Opinion No. 1).
137. Id. at 1523 (Badinter Opinion No. 8).
138. RADAN, supra note 17, at 196.
139. Id. at 198-99.
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was never considered on the formal grounds that the EC would recognize
only republics, 140 not autonomous provinces within republics. 141
The EC's rigid insistence that all of the borders of the republics of the
SFRY be preserved as international borders has been criticized as a misap-
plication of the principle of uti possidetis, and as an inappropriately in-
flexible doctrine. 14 2 Indeed, a more human rights based approach would
seem to be appropriate now that the right to self-determination has been
recognized as the essential foundation of all human rights.
143
IV. A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR KOSOVO
In the twenty-first century, self-determination should be viewed more
as a question of human rights than of national rights. As used here, the term
"national rights" refers both to the sovereign rights of the state and to at-
tempts by a nation group to claim these sovereign rights in a new state
through the process of external self-determination.
There is an inherent tension between the traditional sovereign rights of
states and the development and realization of an international law of human
rights. 144 The potential for this conflict is greatest when it involves the
140. The December 16, 1991, EC Declaration on Yugoslavia, which was the basis for the Badinter
Commission's work, declares that "[tihe Community and its member States agree to recognise the
independence of all the Yugoslav Republics fulfilling all the conditions set out below" and invited "all
Yugoslav Republics to state by 23 December whether., they wish to be recognised as independent
States." EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1485 (emphasis added).
141. As Peter Radan describes it:
In the light of decisions by Slovenia and Croatia in early October 1991 to proceed with seces-
sion, Kosovo declared its independence on 18 October 1991 and began to seek international
recognition, especially from the EC_ This was not forthcoming- Given that the EC was only
prepared to grant recognition to republics of Yugoslavia, and not its autonomous provinces,
Kosovo's application for recognition was not even accepted by the EC for consideration by
the Badinter Commission.
RADAN, supra note 17, at 199-200.
142. See Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis ofthe Opinions of
the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 50, 66-76 (2000).
143. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 12, supra note 52, at para. I. The Human
Rights Committee noted:
The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essen-
tial condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for
the promotion and strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason that States set forth the
right of self-determination in a provision of positive law in both Covenants and placed this
provision as article 1 apart from and before all of the other rights in the two Covenants.
Id.
144. Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating States: A New Chal-
lenge, 68 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 203, 204 (1992). The development of international law is still deeply
constrained by its "state-centric" origins.
According to the prevailing positivist conception of international law, that law derives its
binding force from the consent of sovereign states.... This is one important sense in which
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claim of a minority for external self-determination. Self-determination is a
fundamental right of "peoples" and as such, it is the human rights counter-
part of the rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity held by the states in
which those peoples live. Thus the full realization of the right of a people to
"freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, ' 14 5 for example, re-
quires maintaining sovereignty over the territory in which those resources
are located.
Almost a century ago, both the 1920 Commission of Jurists and the
1921 Commission of Rapporteurs recognized that a failure to provide just
and effective guarantees for the rights of minorities might justify extraordi-
nary derogations from state sovereignty. 146 More recently, 147 the EU has
formally required commitment to guarantees for the rights of minorities as
a precondition to diplomatic recognition by the EC/EU and its member
states. 148 This criterion was applied not merely as a political standard, but
was based on the view that peremptory norms of international law require
states to ensure respect for the rights of minorities.
149
The Security Council has also reaffirmed that the rights of minorities
in Kosovo must be respected. 150 It is therefore clear that the issue of Kos-
ovo's final political status cannot be separated from the imperative need to
international law is centered on states, or "state-centric." In addition, international law was
traditionally thought to create rights and obligations only for states. According to this view in-
ternational law was a law by and for states, in which the rights of individuals had no place.
An important step beyond state-centrism is implicit in the idea of an international law of hu-
man ights, since the rights concerned are those of individuals, or groups of individuals rather
than those of states. The very concept of internationally recognized human lights is in deroga-
tion of state sovereignty, while traditional "state-centric" approaches to international law in-
sist upon a very broad definition of state sovereignty and a formalistic defense of it from any
external intrusion. This traditional concept of international law is inherently inadequate to the
task of protecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms which the UN system is
pledged to promote.
Id.
145. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 56, at art. 1; Covenant on Economic
Rights, supra note 56, at art. 1.
146. See infra notes 163-65 and the accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 132-34 and the accompanying text.
148. The EC/EU standard for recognition requires "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national
groups and minorities in accordance with commitments entered into in the CSCE framework." Arbitra-
tion Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1514 (Badinter Opinion No. 7).
149. The Badinter Commission has noted that "the-now peremptory-norms of international law
require States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities. This requirement applies to all the Republics
vis-a-vis the minorities on their territory." Id. at 1498 (Badinter Opinion No. 2). Additionally, "the
peremptory norms of general international law and, in particular, respect for the fundamental rights of
the individual and the rights of peoples and minorities, are binding on all the parties to the succession."
Id. at 1496 (Badinter Opinion No. 1).
150. The Security Council has called for the determination of Kosovo's future status taking into
account the Rambouillet Accords. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3, 1 (e). The Rambouillet Accords
contain repeated references to the rights of national communities within Kosovo. See Rambouillet
Accords, supra note 123.
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protect the rights of minorities. A national movement for self-determination
that does not fully address minority rights can no longer expect the full
support of the international community.
How does this new legal and political reality affect claims for external
self-determination? As discussed above, the principle of self-determination,
despite its status as a jus cogens norm, does not appear to establish a true
right of external self-determination, other than in cases of so-called salt-
water colonial domination.151 Nonetheless, under certain circumstances,
external self-determination may be justified based on consideration of all
the relevant factors. The Commission of Jurists on the Aaland Island Ques-
tion did not even classify the principle of self-determination as part of posi-
tive law. Nonetheless, the Commission identified one special circumstance
in which external self-determination might be appropriate and suggested
the possibility of another.152
Both involve unusual shifts in the balance between the national rights
of existing sovereign states and the human rights of minority populations.
In the first, the national rights of a sovereign state have been undermined
by circumstances leading to its transformation or dismemberment. In the
second, the failure to protect the fundamental rights of minorities requires
an extraordinary remedy, even if it is at the expense of traditional sovereign
rights.
A. Sovereign Rights in Context: The Transformation and Dismemberment
of a State
The 1920 Aaland Islands Commission of Jurists, even more than to-
day's Security Council, placed a very high value on the rules protecting
state sovereignty and territorial integrity.153 At the same time, the Commis-
151. See supra notes 58-61 and the accompanying text.
152. These two circumstances, i.e., the transformation and dismemberment of a state, and a failure
of just and effective guarantees for minority rights, are discussed in the next section of this article. See
infra notes 153-65 and the accompanying text.
153. In the words of the Commission of Jurists:
[I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of na-
tional territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive Inter-
national Law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it
recognises the right of other States to claim such a separation.
... Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and
would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be
contrary to the very idea embodied in the term "State" but would also endanger the in-
terests of the international community.
Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 5 (emphasis added).
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sion also acknowledged that there are special situations in which the nor-
mal rules do not apply:
It must, however, be observed, that all that has been said concerning
the attributes of the sovereignty of a State, generally speaking, only ap-
plies to a nation which is definitively constituted as a sovereign State
and an independent member of the international community and so long
as it continues to possess these characteristics. From the point of view
of both domestic and international law, the formation, transformation
and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and wars
create situations of fact which, to a large extent, cannot be met by
the application of the normal rules of positive law....
Under such circumstances, the principle of self-determination of
peoples may be called into play. New aspirations of certain sections of
a nation, which are sometimes based on old traditions or on a common
language and civilisation, may come to the surface and produce ef-
fects which must be taken into account in the interests of the internal
and external peace of nations.
154
Secession and independence are not a right or entitlement, but it is un-
deniable that that the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
dismembered as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia
declared themselves independent and achieved both international recogni-
tion by other states and admission to the United Nations. The UN Security
Council declared in a 1992 resolution that "the state formerly know as the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist" 155 and rec-
ommended to the UN General Assembly that it decide that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia 56 (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for
membership in the United Nations and that it should not participate in the
work of the General Assembly. 157 The UN General Assembly agreed and
decided accordingly. 158 This conclusively establishes that, subsequent to
1991, there was a complete transformation and dismemberment of the state
in the SFRY. The Aaland Islands Commission of Jurists has noted that
under these very circumstances, "the principle of self-determination of
peoples may be called into play."'159 It is true that Kosovo's status and cir-
cumstances were different from those of the republics that gained their
independence and recognition in the 1990s. But even though the EC's
Badinter Commission declared that the dissolution of the SFRY was corn-
154. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
155. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116thmtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/777 (1992).
156. Yugoslavia, now reduced to only two republics, is known today as Serbia and Montenegro.
157. Id.
158. G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/471 (1992).
159. Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 6. See the full quotation in the text above
associated with note 154, supra.
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pleted over a decade ago, 160 that conclusion seems false in light of subse-
quent developments in Kosovo. It could be argued that the transformation
and dismemberment of the former SFRY will continue until the final status
of Kosovo has been determined. Equally plausible is the view that Serbia
itself is still undergoing a process of transformation and potential
dismemberment.
The standard set by the 1920 Commission of Jurists was as follows:
[11f the essential basis of these rules, that is to say, territorial sovereignty,
is lacking, either because the state is not yet fully formed or because it is
undergoing transformation or dissolution, the situation is obscure and
uncertain from a legal point of view and will not become clear until
the period of development is completed and a definite new situation,
which is normal in respect to territorial sovereignty, has been
established.
This transition from a de facto situation to a normal situation de
jure... tends to lead to readjustments between the members of the in-
ternational community and to alterations in the territorial and legal
status; consequently, this transition interests the community of States
very deeply both from political and legal standpoints. 161
UNMIK's stated purpose is to provide "transitional administration"
for Kosovo "pending a final settlement."' 162 Undoubtedly then, Kosovo and
Serbia are still caught in a "transition from a defacto situation to a normal
situation dejure." Applying the standard above would leave open the door
to a broad situational analysis of Kosovo's claim to external self-
determination.
B. When Sovereign Rights Must Yield.- A Failure of Just and Effective
Guarantees for Minority Rights
The 1920 Commission of Jurists and the 1921 Commission of Rappor-
teurs both raised the question of whether clear evidence of government-
sponsored atrocities and other repression of a local minority, or any other
failure to provide adequate guarantees for minority rights, could justify
international scrutiny and possibly international action in derogation of
state sovereignty. 163 The Commission of Jurists largely sidestepped the
160. Arbitration Commission: Opinions, supra note 15, at 1523 (Badinter Opinion No. 8).
161. Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 6 (emphasis added).
162. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 3, 10, 11 (a).
163. The specific issue being addressed by the Commission of Jurists was that part of Article 15 of
the League of Nations Covenant which barred the League's Council from discussing anything "found
by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of that party." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15. A similar rule appears in Article 2(7) of the
268 [Vol 80:235
2005] HUMAN RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE FINAL STATUS OF KOSOVO 269
question, noting that it was not directly raised by the case under
consideration:
The Commission, in affirming these principles, does not give an opinion
concerning the question as to whether a manifest and continued abuse of
sovereign power, to the detriment of a section of the population of a
State, would, if such circumstances arose, give to an international dispute
arising therefrom, such a character that its object should be considered as
one which is not confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the State con-
cerned, but comes within the sphere of action of the League of Nations.
Such a supposition clearly does not apply to the case under considera-
tion, and has not been put forward by either of the parties to the
dispute.1
64
The second commission that addressed the Aaland Islands case, the
1921 Commission of Rapporteurs, went much further in stating that exter-
nal self-determination could be considered where just and effective guaran-
tees for minority rights were not available:
What reasons would there be for allowing a minority to separate itself
from the State to which it is united, if this State gives it the guarantees
which it is within its rights in demanding, for the preservation of its so-
cial, ethnical or religious character? Such indulgence, apart from every
political consideration, would be supremely unjust to the State prepared
to make these concessions.
The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part
and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an al-
together exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks ei-
ther the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective
guarantees. 165
Such was the view of the League's Commission of Rapporteurs in
1921. The balance between the rights of state sovereignty and what we now
call human rights has shifted dramatically since then. The Council of the
League of Nations was barred from acting on any matter it found to be
"solely within the domestic jurisdiction"1 66 of a state, whereas the UN Se-
curity Council can now act on any matter it determines to constitute a threat
to international peace and security. 167 So, although the Council of the
UN Charter. See supra notes 101-02 and the accompanying text. The issue of whether such atrocities
come within the sphere of international authorities is relevant to the delimitation of Security Council
prerogatives with regard to Kosovo.
164. Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 5.
165. CASSESE, supra note 30, at 31 n.58 (quoting Report Presented to the Council of the League by
the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921)) (emphasis added).
166. The Covenant of the League of Nations provides:
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to
arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of
that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15.
167. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
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League of Nations might hypothetically have been able to address Kos-
ovo's final status, the present Security Council's authority to do so is un-
ambiguous. 168 It seems equally clear that the "altogether exceptional
solution" of external self-determination must remain an option where nec-
essary for the protection of minority rights.
The minority rights argument does not establish Kosovo's right to in-
dependence and sovereignty, although it does open the door for that possi-
bility. Minority rights considerations do support the Security Council's
authority to decide on Kosovo's final status if ultimately called upon to do
so.
C. Compromise May Be Necessary to Preserve Minority Rights
If left to the Security Council, it is difficult to predict what the deci-
sion on Kosovo's final status would be. Kosovo's historical, cultural, and
political case for external self-determination (independence) may be a
strong one, but it is only one of many factors to be considered. Geographi-
cal and economic factors must be weighed, 169 and, of course, the protection
of minorities (and potentially of minorities within the minority) must be
addressed.
Woodrow Wilson, so historically identified with advancing the cause
of self-determination, recognized the need to balance that principle with the
requirements of a lasting peace. In the same speech to Congress in which
he declared self-determination to be "an imperative principle of action,"
Wilson stressed practical and situational limits in the interests of peace.
170
The equally pragmatic conclusion of the Aaland Islands Commission of
Jurists was that "[u]nder such circumstances, a solution in the nature of a
compromise, based on an extensive grant of liberty to minorities, may ap-
pear necessary according to international legal conception and may even be
dictated by the interests of peace."171
168. See supra notes 101-12 and the accompanying text.
169. According to the Commission of Jurists, many factors must be balanced in deciding the issue:
The fact must, however, not be lost sight of that the principle that nations must have the right
of self-determination is not the only one to be taken into account. Even though it be regarded
as the most important of the principles governing the formation of States, geographical, eco-
nomic and other similar considerations may put obstacles in the way of its complete recogni-
tion.
Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 6.
170. Even for Wilson, the idealist, world peace had to come first: "fourth, that all well defined
national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without
introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in
time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." WILSON'S 1918 ADDRESS TO
CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 478 (emphasis added).
171. Commission of Jurists Report, supra note 47, at 6.
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On the final status issue as well, both legal and political considerations
may require compromise. Somewhat paradoxically, international support
for the independence of Kosovo may well be diminished if Kosovar Alba-
nian leaders are perceived to be insisting on that result solely on the
grounds of narrow national rights. The most cogent arguments on final
political status will be those that stress an overall balance of considerations,
including not only state sovereignty and human rights but also other mat-
ters affecting international peace and security.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RELEVANT TO FINAL STATUS
ISSUES
Contemporary legal and political standards increasingly reverse tradi-
tional priorities to stress human rights and the interests of the international
community, rather than state-centered national rights and interests. The
principle of self-determination has a dual aspect, with one foot in each of
these two worlds. It is grounded in the human rights of a people and may
potentially culminate in the sovereign national rights of a state.
The principle of self-determination must be applied to Kosovo, but in
what form? Independence and sovereignty are not rights that Kosovo can
automatically claim as a matter of law. International law does not compel
any particular solution for Kosovo, not independence nor any other; how-
ever, international law does demand effective protections for minority
rights. Independence for Kosovo might be a solution, but if it were to leave
minorities feeling as persecuted, excluded, and disempowered within the
new Kosovo as Kosovar Albanians felt within Serbia, Kosovo's independ-
ence could potentially create as many problems as it resolves.
Kosovar Albanian leaders can make their best and most effective case
for independence in terms of postcolonial human rights-based standards.
To do so, they must acknowledge that their national right to external self-
determination is no more absolute than Serbia's state-centered right to terri-
torial integrity. Each must yield as necessary to considerations of human
rights and international peace and security.
Determining Kosovo's final political status will be inherently difficult.
No one relishes the prospect of compromise on sensitive issues of sover-
eignty. But only negotiations without unrealistic preconditions can fully
explore the possibilities for compromise and agreement. If representatives
of Serbia refuse to discuss Kosovo's independence or to consider any com-
promise to the territorial sovereignty of Serbia, and if representatives of
Kosovo refuse to discuss proposals for autonomy or adjustments to the
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existing boundaries, meaningful negotiations will be impossible. Neither
party will benefit from such an impasse.
It is unrealistic to expect that the Security Council or some other in-
ternational body will inevitably grant Kosovo independence. The tradi-
tional sovereign right to territorial integrity remains a powerful and
relevant value both for states in general and for the UN Security Council.
After all that has happened, it is equally unrealistic to expect that the Coun-
cil will unconditionally restore the entire territory of Kosovo to Serbia.
The Serbian government and the Kosovar Albanian leadership should
seek an agreement on final status accommodating not only their own inter-
ests, but also taking into account those of the international community as a
whole. It will not be easy. Resolution will require outside political interven-
tion by the Security Council and key states. So far that intervention has
come principally in the form of mediation and political guidance. The mes-
sage in that guidance, both for Kosovo and for Serbia, is that both groups
should engage in a realistic and meaningful dialogue.
17 2
If the parties cannot agree, the Security Council, acting to protect in-
ternational peace and security, may eventually have to assume responsibil-
ity for deciding upon Kosovo's final political status. The members of the
Security Council do not relish this prospect and neither should the parties.
If the Security Council, on its own, must concoct a Solomonic com-
promise on sovereignty, the results will be both unpredictable and of uncer-
tain effect. Such a solution could be long in coming and even then might
not prove to be viable in the long term. There is certainly no guarantee that
such a solution would satisfy Albanians, Serbs, or any of the other parties.
For their own self-interest, these parties should accept responsibility for
negotiating their own future.
172. See S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 1, 4; S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 89, 3; S.C. Res. 1203,
supra note 89, 5; see also EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 18.
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